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PROPERTY LAW IN MISSOURI*
WuizARD L. ECKHARDT**
JOINT TENANCIES AND TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETY-WORDS
OF SURVIVORSIP-JOINT TENANCY OR TENANCY BY THE
ENTIRETY IN FEE, OR "JOINT" LIFE ESTATE WITH
CONTINGENT REMAINDER IN FEE IN SURVIVOR
§ 1. INTRODUCTION
The leading case of Watson v. Muirhead' held that a non-negligent,
reasonably competent title examiner was not liable for errors in judgment
even though his client suffered loss by reason of a defect in title. In that
case the court, through Sharswood, J., said that "to hold [the title ex-
mainer] . . . responsible would be to establish a rule, the direct effect
of which would be to deter all prudent and responsible men from pur-
suing a vocation environed with such perils."2 The decision was advan-
tageous to the title examiner in that it limited his liability, but the de-
cision was to his disadvantage in that it was the immediate cause of title
insurance as an alternative method of assuring title.8
From the title examiner's point of view, the most important property
decision in 1958-1959 is Hunter v. Hunter,4 and from Watson v. Muirhead
the title examiner may derive some small comfort.
§ 2. HuN m v. Hux'r STATD
Hunter v. Hunter arose as follows. The testatrix, in the hospital and
facing a serious operation, executed the will in question in 1950. In part
it provided
I give and devise unto my mother, [M], and unto my sister, [S],
as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, all the real estate
which I may own at the time of my death. (Emphasis added.)
*This Article contains a very complete discussion of the case Mr. Eckhardt
considered most significant of all the cases reported in 313 S.W.2d through 322
S.W.2d.
**Professor of Law, University of Missouri; B.S., University of Illinois, 1935,
LL.B., 1937; Sterling Fellow, Yale University, 1937-1938.
1. 57 Pa. 161 (1868).
2. Id. at 168.
3. See generally GAGE, LAxD TiTLE AssuRmG AGEN iEs 78-81 (1937).
4. 320 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1959).
(456)
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[Note that a fee was not expressly limited.] The testatrix died sixteen
months later owning the land'in question.
Shortly before her death in 1956, M, one of the devisees, made a
conveyance through a straw party to herself for life with remainer in
fee to her granddaughter, N, a niece of the testatrix. M's clear purpose
was to turn a joint tenancy in fee with the incident of survivorship into
a tenancy in common in fee without the incident of survivorship.
After M's death N brought a suit to determine title, claiming an un-
divided one-half in fee, on the theory that the will created a joint tenancy
in fee and that M's deed turned the joint tenancy into a tenancy in com-
mon with no incident of survivorship. This theory was adopted by the trial
court and judgment was entered for N for one-half. On appeal the court
adopted S's theory that the will created a joint tenancy for life in M and S
[actually a tenancy in common for the life of the shorter liver, more of
which later], with a contingent remainder in fee in the whole in the
survivor, an interest which was not affected by M's conveyance out in
1956.r
The actual intention of the testatrix may well have been that the
survivor of M and S take the whole without any power to defeat sur-
vivorship, and in view of the respective ages this almost certainly would
be S. The testimony as to intention is summarized by the appellant,6 but
the trial court apparently excluded from evidence all of the offered
testimony as to actual intention,7 and the respondent, of course, did not
offer evidence as to intention in view of her position on appellant's
evidence. It is not certain what actual intention might have been found
5. The issue was not raised on appeal and apparently was not raised in trial
court, but it should be noted that if contingent remainders are destructible in
Missouri, S would have recieved only one-half under her theory, the theory adopted
by the court. The residuary clause (Brief for Respondent, p. 3) ran in favor of M,
and under this clause M would receive the reversion in the whole (there being a
reversion following a contingent remainder in fee), in addition to the one-half for
life X received under the earlier clause in issue. M's 1956 conveyance would effect
a merger and the contingent remainder in fee in S would be destroyed as to one
half. Lewin v. Bell, 285 I. 227, 120 N.E. 633 (1918).
Hunter v. Hunter is another Missouri case holding in fact that contingent re-
mainders are not destructible, but without noticing or discussing the problem.
See generally Eckhardt, The Destructibility of Contingent Remainders in Mis-
souri, 6 Mo. L. Rxv. 268-96 (1941); and Eckhardt & Peterson, Possessory Estates,
Future Interest and Conveyances in Missour , 23 VA.M.S. § 49 (1952), and authorities
cited therein.
6. Brief for Appellant, pp. 10-16.
7. Brief for Respondent, p. 1; 320 S.W.2d at 534.
1959]
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had the issue been fully developed on both sides. The view of the court
on appeal was that the intention of the testatrix should be determined
from the will alone and not from extrinsic evidence of intention.8
In construing the clause in issue, the court emphasized that there
were no words expressly indicating a joint tenancy in fee. The court
held that Sec. 474.480, RSMo 1957 Supp., the section raising a presump-
tion of a fee, was not applicable because there was a contrary intention.9
The court also emphasized that in interpreting a will it must give
effect to every leading word in the will.'0 By finding a joint life estate,
with remainder in fee in the whole in the survivor, the court felt that
it was giving effect to the words "with right of survivorship" and that
only by such construction are those words given any meaning. The court
rejected the argument that the words were simply descriptive of the
principal incident of a joint tenancy in fee.
It is respectfully submitted that the court failed to apply this same
rule, that in construing and interpreting wills courts should give effect
to every clause and portion of a will, to another key phrase in the will,
viz., "as joint tenants." The court's construction left the words "as joint
tenants" with no meaning or significance. A "joint tenancy" of a life
estate for the life of the shorter liver of two persons is not a joint ten-
ancy but is a tenancy in common. As between two persons, the words
"as joint tenants" are given effect only if the estate is for a greater period
than the life of the shorter liver.
The two cases principally relied on as precedents (there being, as
the court recognized, no reported case directly in point) can and should
be distinguished on the grounds that in each case there were more than
two joint tenants and in each case there were words fairly susceptible
of construction as creating a remainder in fee in the last survivor.
§ 3. QuARmi v. Qu.uwR STATED
In Quarm v. Quarm" there was a devise in 1843 to the testator's
8. 320 S.W.2d at 534.
9. Id. at 532.
10. Ibid.
11. L.R. [1892] 1 Q.B. 184, 40 Weekly Reporter 302 (Q.B. 1892), 66 L.T.R. (n.s.)
418 (Q.B. 1892) (the complete devise is set out verbatim at p. 418), 61 L.J.Q.B. (n.s.)
154 (1891) (this is the report quoted in the principal case). The facts are not fully
stated in any of the four reports, but may be pieced together from the several
different statements of facts. Quartm v. Quarm is considered at some length in 320
S.W. at 532-33.
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widow for life, with remainder to the testator's brother for life, with
remainder to seven named persons
as joint tenants, and not as tenants in common, and to the sur-
vivor or longest liver of them, his or her heirs and assigns for
ever.
In 1869 one of the joint tenants (who ultimately became the survivor)
became a bankrupt and his interest under the devise was conveyed to
the plaintiff. In 1883 the three "joint" tenants then alive partitioned
among themselves. Two of these persons died in the period 1883-1889 and
the last survivor of the seven died in 1889.
The plaintiff (successor to the last survivor) claimed the devise
created a joint tenancy for life [of the next to the longest liver], with a
contingent remainder in fee in the survivor, not subject to being cut
down by severance. The defendants claimed the devise created a joint
tenancy in fee and that the incident of survivorship had been defeated
by severance; there also was a claim that the plaintiff was barred by ad-
verse possession, apparently on the theory her rights arose in 1869 rather
than in 1889 when the last two surviving "joint" tenants died. The court
adopted the plaintiff's theory and held the devise created a joint tenancy
for life with a contingent remainder in fee in the survivor.
It should be noted that the words "as joint tenants" have some mean-
ing and effect where applied to a joint life estate in seven persons,
measured by the life of the next to the longest liver. It should be noted
also that there is not simply a descriptive recital "with right of survivor-
ship" but rather express words easily construed as creating a remainder
in fee in the whole, viz., "and to the survivor or longest liver of them"
in fee. Even if Quarm v. Quarm were accepted as a sound decision (and
this writer has considerable doubts as to its soundness), it is clearly dis-
tinguishable from the principal case, Hunter v. Hunter.
§ 4. Jow~s v. SNYDER STATED
The other case cited by the court which is somewhat in point is
Jones v. Snyder.12 In 1905 an elderly childless widower, Root, asked his
brother-in-law, Snyder, to move from Washington, D.C., to Bay City,
MVichigan, to take charge of Root's business, and (together with Snyder's
wife and daughter) to live with him. Root conveyed the residence and
12. 218 Mich. 446, 188 N.W. 505 (1922). This case is cited in 320 S.W.2d at 534.
19591
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1959], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss4/5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
business property through a straw party to himself, Snyder, Snyder's
wife, and Snyder's daughter
as joint tenants and to their heirs and assigns, and to the sur-
vivors or survivor of them, and to the heirs and assigns of the
survivors or survivor of them, forever.1
3
Difficulties arose and before two years had passed Root filed a bill to
set aside the deeds; the conveyances were sustained, Root getting the
whole use of the residence and one-third of the income from the business.
In 1908 Root went to live with a cousin; in 1919 Root conveyed to her
an undivided one-half interest in the residence and business. At the
time of this litigation Snyder's daughter was the sole survivor.
The court construed the deed as creating a joint tenancy for life,
with a contingent remainder in fee in the whole in the survivor. The
court made this construction in order to give some effect to the words
"survivors or survivor," and relied on Quarm v. Quarm, § 3 supra, and
two earlier Michigan cases where the limitations prima facie created
tenancies in common but where there were words of survivorship.1 4
It should be noticed that here, as in the Quarm case, there were
more than two "joint" tenants, and consequently the words in the limi-
tation "as joint tenants" have some significance as applied to a life estate
for the life of the next to the longest liver of four persons. In addition,
13. The deeds are set out in full in Root v. Snyder, 161 Mich. 200, 207, 126 N.W.
206, 209 (1910).
14. These two cases, cited in 320 S.W.2d at 534, are typical of many cases where
a limitation is ineffective to create a joint tenancy in fee or a tenancy by the entirety
in fee with the inherent incident of survivorship, but where the court nevertheless
construed the limitation so that there was survivorship, often by finding a con-
tingent remainder in fee in the survivor.
The defect in the original limitation usually results from a failure to use an
essential formula such as "as joint tenants and not as tenants in common" (see §
442A50, RSMo 1949, as to the essential words in Missouri), or results from an
attempted direct conveyance (no longer a problem in Missouri in view of § 442.025,
RSMo 1957 Supp., effective in 1953; see Title Examination Standard No. 28, "Direct
conveyances on or after August 29, 1953, Sec. 442.025, RSMo 1949," 23 V.A.M.S.
ch. 442 App.).
See generally Annot., Creation of right of survivorship by instrument ineffec-
tive to create estate by entireties or joint tenancy, 1 A.L.R.2d 247-60 (1948).
Cases of this type where words of survivorship are given substantial effect
are cases where the courts are carrying out the clear intention of the grantor or the
testator as expressed on the face of the instrument. Hunter v. Hunter and related
cases are in an entirely different category, because in the Hunter type of case the
limitation is effective to create a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety, as the
case may be, with the inherent incident of survivorship, and there is no need to take
into account and give substantial effect to express words of survivorship.
[Vol. 24
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as in the Quarn case, the express words "to the survivors or survivor of
them" can be construed without violence as creating a remainder in fee
in the whole. Even if Jones v. Snyder were accepted as a sound de-
cision (and this writer has considerable doubts as to its soundness, unless
one takes into account extrinsic evidence as to the situation of the parties
and their intention), it is clearly distinguishable from the principal
case, Hunter v. Hunter.1 5
It is submitted that neither Quarm v. Quarm nor Jones v. Snyder
is persuasive when the limitation in the Hunter case is considered. The
words "as joint tenants" are left without any meaning as applied to a
life estate in two persons measured by the life of the shorter liver. "With
right of survivorship" is a far cry from the words "to the survivor in fee."
§ 5. To A and B as Joint Tenants with Right of Survivoship-LIABIrrY
OF TITLE EXAMINER WHO HAS PASSED TITLE AS JOINT TENANCY
IN FEE
The writer does not know how many title examiners have approved
titles on a joint tenancy in fee construction where the limitations were
essentially the same as in Hunter v. Hunter, but undoubtedly some such
titles have been passed, and unless these titles are perfected by adverse
possession "owners" may lose their land. It is believed that most, if not
all, title examiners would have been of opinion that the limitation in
Hunter v. Hunter created a joint tenancy in fee which was effectively
severed by the conveyance out, and that the survivor would take only
one-half of the fee. A title examiner who passed such a title was not negli-
gent or incompetent, but rather made an error of judgment (or lacked
clairvoyance) for which he is not liable.
It is significant that leading form books show a limitation substan-
tially the same as in Hunter v. Hunter as the appropriate limitation for
creating a joint tenancy in fee. For example, 4 AM. JuR. Legal Forms
Annot. § 4:1129 (1953) is the only form given for creation of a joint
tenancy by will. This form is as follows:
I, 1 , give, devise, and bequeath to 2 and
3 , as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and
not as tenants in common, the following described property
to wit: 4
15. The initial part of the limitation in Jones v. Snyder had sufficient express
words to create a joint tenancy in fee. See § 9 below.
19591
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1959], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss4/5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
It will be noticed that the operative words in this form are identical
with the operative words in Hunter v. Hunter except that the limitation
in Hunter v. Hunter did not include the words "and not as tenants in
common." These additional words are of no significance in the problem
of construction; they are not necessary in Missouri but are required in
some states to create a joint tenancy. There is no indication by annota-
tion in the form book that the above form will have any effect other
than to create a garden variety joint tenancy in fee. 4 AM. Jun. Legal
Forms Annot. § 4:1123 (1953), a deed form, is almost identical.
In another widely used form book, MODERN LErGAL FoRms § 3236
(1938), a joint tenancy clause for use in a deed, is as follows:
To and as joint tenants and not as tenants
in common, with full right of survivorship.
Again there is no indication that the effect of this form will be other than
to create an ordinary joint tenancy in fee.
In still another widely used form book, NiCHOLS, CYCLOPEDIA OF
LEGAL FoRnMs ANNOT., the first joint tenancy form for use in a will is
section 5.1675 (A), and provides as follows:
To and , as joint tenants, with full rights
of survivorship.
As in the other form books, there is no caveat.
Certainly there is a reasonable basis for a title examiner to assume
that these three substantially identical forms from widely used form
books would be construed by a court to effect their obvious purpose, par-
ticularly where there was no reported case to the contrary.
§ 6. To H and W as Tenants by the Entirety with Right of Survivor-
ship-CONSTRUCTION
If the doctrine of Hunter v. Hunter were confined to joint tenancies
the problem would not be so serious. Although there are joint tenancy
limitations in substantial number in Missouri, they are not too common,
and only infrequently is there an attempt to turn a joint tenancy into
a tenancy in common and do away with the incident of survivorship.
It would seem however that the doctrine of Hunter v. Hunter would
apply equally to entireties limitations and that a limitation creating a
tenancy by the entirety would receive the same construction as a cor-
[Vol. 24
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responding limitation creating a joint tenancy. Thus a limitation running
to H and W as tenants by the entriety with right of survivorship;
or to H and W with right of survivorship
would seem to create a tenacy by the entirety for the life of the shorter
liver with a contingent remainder in fee in the survivor.
If the husband and wife join in a conveyance out there is no problem.
If they do not convey out and the marriage relationship subsists until
one of them dies the survivor takes the whole and there is no problem.
If the parties are divorced and if there is a properly drawn property
settlement, the interests of the parties will be clear after the divorce.
If the parties are divorced and if there is no property settlement, then
by Missouri common law the tenancy by entireties becomes a tenancy
in common. This creates no particular problem if the entireties estate is
in fee. But if the construction of the limitation is that there is a tenancy
by entireties only for the life of the shorter liver with a contingent
remainder in fee to the survivor, it would seem that the effect of the
divorce would be to turn the life estate into a tenancy in common but
not to affect the contingent remainder in fee in the survivor. Thus, title
is uncertain until either the ex-husband or the ex-wife dies and it can be
determined which one is the survivor.
Under the construction that the limitation creates a tenancy by
the entireties in fee, a creditor can not reach the property to satisfy the
separate debt of one of the spouses. The two spouses joining together can
convey out and defeat a federal tax lien for the obligation of one of the
spouses, and in like manner could defeat a judgment lien for the debt of
one of the spouses. . 6 Under the life estate and remainder construction, a
creditor of one of the spouses could reach the contingent remainder, sub-
ject to the condition precedent of the debtor surviving.
The incident of survivorship in the case of a tenancy by the entirety
cannot be extinguished by a conveyance out by one of the spouses dur-
ing coverture; the entireties estate has the characteristic of durability.
The separate conveyance by one spouse of entireties property is said
to be void but his deed nevertheless may become effective on an estoppel
16. See Hutcherson v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 168 (WJ). Mo. 1950), affd,
United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951), Kelly, Real Property-
Tenancy by the Entirety-Conveying Free of Income Tax Lien Against Husband,
16 Mo. L. Rav. 183 (1951).
1959]
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by deed theory if the spouse who conveys out survives. Under the con-
struction that the limitation creates a tenancy by the entirety in fee, it
is probable that a conveyance out by one spouse would not disable that
spouse from later joining with the other spouse in conveying out the fee,
as noted with reference to extinguishing liens in the paragraph next
above, thus circumventing perfection of the original conveyance on
the theory of estoppel by deed. Under a life estate and remainder con-
struction, either spouse could convey freely his or her contingent re-
mainder without joiner of the other spouse.
Inasmuch as the form of limitation considered in this section is ex-
actly parallel with the one construed in Hunter v. Hunter, the limitation
probably will be construed as creating a tenancy by the entirety for the
life of the shorter liver, with contingent remainder in fee in the survivor.
On the other hand, the court may confine the life estate and remainder
construction to joint tenancy limitations, in which case the entireties
limitation under consideration in this secton would create a tenancy by
the entirety in fee. The title examiner must assume the construction most
unfavorable to the title.
§ 7. To A and B as Joint Tenants, Their Assigns, the Survivor of them
and the Heirs and Assigns of the Survivor-CoNsTRucTioN
A common limitation for creating a joint tenancy in fee, if respectable
form books are good evidence of practice, is the following, often with
slight but immaterial variations in wording:
to A and B as joint tenants, their assigns, the survivor of them
and the heirs and assigns of the survivor.
Probably the explanation for the popularity of this basic form is the
fact that a limitation running "to A and B and their heirs and assigns"
is not strictly accurate because in the usual course of events one party
will survive to the whole and only his heirs and assigns will take. Con-
sequently conveyancers have developed a type of limitation which in-
dicates with more precision the usual course of devolution of the prop-
erty, viz., to A and B as joint tenants, their assigns (if they assign), the
survivor of them (if they have not assigned), and the heirs and assigns
of the survivor. This form is used without any intention of limiting or
doing away with the usual incidents of a joint tenancy in fee, including
the power of one joint tenant to turn the estate into a tenancy in common
and to extinguish the right of survivorship.
[Vol. 24
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4 A.m. JuR. Legal Forms Arnot. uses substantially the above type of
limitation in three different sections, §§ 4:1121, 4:1122 and 4:1126. For
example, § 4:1126 shows an habendum provision as follows:
To have and to hold the above described premises, with the
appurtenances, unto the said grantees as joint tenants, and not
as tenants in common, and to their assigns, or to the heirs and
assigns of the survivor of them, forever.
McCune Gill's books should be persuasive as to accepted Missouri prac-
tice. GIL, Mxhssoum REAL ESTATE FoPms § 347 (2d ed. 1931), in extract
is as follows:
the premises name" and , as joint tenants
and not as tenants in common... parties of the second part";
the grant runs "unto the said parties of the second part, and to
the survivor of them"; and the habendum and warranty clauses
run "unto the said parties of the second part, and to the survivor
of them, and to the heirs and assigns of such survivor forever."
In 1 GILL, REAL PROPERTY LAw IN Missoupa 272 (1949), there is a
"Form Creating Joint Tenancy" which is very similar to the form next
above, and in extract is as follows:
the premises name "John Smith and George Smith, as joint
tenants and to the survivor of them, and not as tenants in com-
mon.., parties of the second part"; the grant runs "unto the
said parties of the second part, as joint tenants and to the sur-
vivor of them, and not as tenants in common"; and the habendum
and warranty clauses run "unto the said parties of the second
part, as joint tenants and to the survivor of them, and not as
tenants in common, and to the heirs and assigns of such sur-
vivor forever."
The above forms of limitation are much more susceptible of a life
estate and remainder construction than was the limitation in Hunter
v. Hunter. "To the survivor" can be construed as creating a contingent
remainder in fee in the survivor without doing violence to the language
much more easily than can a recital "with right of survivorship." The
writer always has been a little skeptical of this type of limitation, not
because he thought a court would construe it as creating a life estate
and contingent remainder in fee, but because someone might contend
for a contingent remainder construction and there would be a possibility
of litigation with at least nuisance value.
19591
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In view of Hunter v. Hunter it is believed that a title examiner
must now assume that the above form of limitation may create a joint
tenancy in fee, or in the alternative may create a tenancy in common
for the life of the shorter liver of two grantees with a contingent re-
mainder in fee in the survivor, or if there are more than two grantees,
a joint tenancy for the life of the next to the longest liver with a con-
tingent remainder in fee in the last survivor.
Where there is any substantial doubt as to the construction which a
court may make a title examiner must assume the construction most un-
favorable to the title. With this form of limitation a title examiner must
get a judicial construction of the instrument or must get deeds from
everyone who would have an interest under either possible construction
of the limitation.
It is probable that this form of limitation will be construed as creat-
ing a joint tenancy in fee, because Hunter v. Hunter probably will be con-
fined as narrowly as possible, but a title cannot be passed on such a
probability.
§ 8. To H and W as Tenants by the Entirety, Their Joint Assigns, the
Survivor of Them and the Heirs and Assigns of the Survivor-
CONSTRUCTION
A common limitation for creating a tenancy by the entirety in fee,
if respectable form books are good evidence of practice, is the following,
often with slight but immaterial variations in wording:
to H and W as tenants by the entirety, their joint assigns, the
survivor of them and the heirs and assigns of the survivor.
The reason for the popularity of this basic form is discussed in the
section next above in connection with joint tenancies. The form simply
indicates the usual course of devolution of the property and is used
without any intention of limiting or doing away with the usual incidents
of a tenancy by the entirety, including the disability of either spouse to
convey by separate deed and including the conversion into a-tenancy in
common in fee upon absolute divorce.
The forms in G.L, MhssouRi REAL ESTATE FoRMs § 346 (2d ed. 1931)
and in 1 G.L, REAL PROPERTY LAW IN MissouRi 271 (1949) are sub-
stantially the same and in extract are as follows:
the premises name "John Smith and Mary Smith, his wife, as
[Vol. 24
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tenants by the entirety and to the survivor of them... parties of
the second part"; the grant runs "unto the said parties of the
second part, as tenants by the entirety and to the survivor of
them"; and the habendum and warranty clauses run "unto the
said parties of the second part, as tenants by the entirety and to
the survivor of them and to the heirs and assigns of such sur-
vivor forever."
The same conclusions must be drawn with reference to the use of
such entireties forms as were drawn in § 7 next above as to similar joint
tenancy forms, viz., that such a limitation is much more susceptible
of a life estate and remainder construction than was the limitation in
Hunter v. Hunter, and such a limitation may create a tenancy by the
entirety in fee, or in the alternative may create a tenancy by the entirety
for the life of the shorter liver of H and W with a contingent remainder
in fee in the survivor.
§ 9. To A and B in Fee as Joint Tenants with Rights of Survivorship, OR
To H and W in Fee as Tenants by the Entirety with Right of
Survivorship-CoNsTRucTIoN
The limitation in Hunter v. Hunter, "to M and S, as joint tenants
with right of survivorship," did not expressly limit a fee. The-problem
arises as to what construction would be put on a similar limitation in a
deed or will where there are additional words expressly indicating a
fee, such as
to A and B in fee (or and their heirs) as joint tenants with
right of survivorship; or to H and W in fee (or and their heirs)
as tenants by the entirety with right of survivorship.
The court in Hunter v. Hunter emphasized that in that case there
were no words expressly creating a joint tenancy in fee, and that by
reason of contrary intent the statutory presumption of a fee did not
apply; the court gave substantial effect to the words "with right of
survivorship."
Where there are express words sufficient to create a fee, the case
can be clearly distinguished from Hunter v. Hunter, but nevertheless the
court may insist on giving substantial effect to the words "with right of
survivorship," and find a conflict of repugnancy within the limitation;
conceivably this conflict might be resolved in favor of a life estate and
remainder construction. In the Michigan case of Jones v. Snyder, dis-
cussed in § 4 above, the initial gift was made to four persons "as joint
1959]
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tenants, and to their heirs and assigns" (i.e., as joint tenants in fee)
with added words "to the survivor." In spite of the initial limitation as
joint tenants in fee, the court reached a life estate and remainder in fee
construction.
The problem considered in this section is further complicated in
the case of a deed where the interests granted may be expressed in three
or four different places and where there is often an inconsistency
between the different parts of the deed, typed and printed. For example,
in extract an actual deed on a printed form might run as follows:
the premises [typed execpt for the words "parties of the second
part"] name "A and B as joint tenants with right of survivorship,
parties of the second part"; the grant [printed] runs "unto the
said parties of the second part"; and the habendum and warranty
clauses [printed except for the word "their"] run "unto the said
parties of the second part, and to their heirs and assigns, for-
ever."
In such case the typewritten premises would indicate a life estate and
remainder construction under Hunter v. Hunter. The printed habendum
and warranty clauses would be sufficient to create a fee. Ordinarily the
typewritten portions would prevail over the printed portions, but a
court probably would hold that the deed as a whole created a joint
tenancy in fee. There being some doubt as to what a court might do, a
title examiner must resolve doubts against the title and assume that the
deed may be construed either to create a life estate and remainder in fee
or to create a joint tenancy in fee.
There are essentially the same doubts as to the construction of an
entireties limitation in the form considered in this section.
§ 10. CONCLUSIONS AS TO CONSTRUCTION WHERE "WITH RIGHT OF SURVI-
VORSHIP" OR "TO THE SURVIVOR" IS USED IN A JOINT TENANCY OR
ENTIRETIES LMTATION
This much is clear. Unless and until Hunter v. Hunter is clearly con-
fined by subsequent decisions, a draftsman in creating a joint tenancy
in fee or a tenancy by entireties in fee in real estate in Missouri should
omit completely the words "to the survivor" and the words "with right
of survivorship," or the substantial equivalent of either.
It is not so clear what should be done with reference to existing
transactions. In many cases of course the ensuing course of events will
be such that it is immaterial whether the construction be one of a joint
[Vol. 24
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estate in fee or of a life estate with a remainder in fee. Where the con-
struction does make a difference the effect of Hunter v. Hunter must be
considered from two different points of view: first, whether titles based
on such transactions are good in fact; and second, whether such titles
are marketable of record.
As to whether a title is good in fact, Hunter v. Hunter of course will
control as to the joint tenancy limitation there used. §§ 2-5 above, and
will be difficult to get around in the case of parallel entireties limita-
tions, § 6 above. The real explanation of Hunter v. Hunter may be that
it is one of those hard cases which makes bad law. If this was a hard case
in which the court felt impelled to let S survive to the whole in fee, the
court had two ways in which to reach this end result: first, by con-
struction, the method adopted; and second, by admitting extrinsic evi-
dence of intention, the method rejected (wisely, because to admit
extrinsic evidence would open a Pandora's box). If this was a hard case,
then the court may be expected to confine its rule to the limitation there
considered, and not to extend it to the other types of limitations dis-
cussed in §§ 7-9 above. In this event, very few titles under such limita-
tions will be upset and most of such titles will be good in fact.
Even if such titles are considered to be good in fact and defensible,
it is believed that there is enough possibility of litigation to make the
titles, or most of them, unmarketable of record until the court has spoken
further. It is believed that the only completely safe course for the
individual title examiner who is considering a joint tenancy or en-
tireties limitation including words of survivorship is to get a judicial
construction of the particular limitaton or to get deeds from all persons
who might have an interest under either the fee construction or the life
estate and remainder construction. A title insurance company which can
take some business risk might well be justified in insuring certain of
these titles under an assumed fee construction where the risk of a life
estate and remainder construction is very slight and for practical pur-
poses the title might be considered marketable.
It is suggested that lawyers who have occasion to brief problems
raised by Hunter v. Hunter study the briefs in the Hunter case. These
briefs, prepared by experienced counsel, are the result of very extensive
research and are exceptionally able briefs. They should be very helpful
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